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Abstract
This paper investigates the differential impact of employment in agriculture on rural
and non-rural wages using the quarterly labor force survey (LFS) collected by the
Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). We estimate the wage equation for rural
and non-rural workers controlling for structural, socioeconomic, and political factors.
The results suggest that employment in agriculture lowers the average wage by a
range from 26 to 34 % for the non-rural population and 30–37 % for rural population.
Meanwhile, Israeli closures tend to raise the probability of selecting agriculture as a
sector for employment. Among other findings, the results also show that returns to
education are lower for rural workers than for non-rural workers.
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1 Introduction
The Palestinian labor market has experienced considerable attention from researchers
from within and outside the region for two reasons. The first is the release of raw data
from the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) at the turn of the century of the
quarterly labor force survey, and the second is due to the conflict with Israel and the
lack of progress in the peace process. Although Palestine is geographically a small area,
it is far from being contiguous. Settlements and security zones inhibit rural urban mi-
gration, and as a result, we notice higher migration in the Gaza Strip than in the West
Bank because Gaza is free of settlements (despite the blockade). Another unique
feature of the Palestinian labor markets is the proximity to the Israeli labor market and
the frequent interruptions to labor flows; this has considerable negative shocks to rural
Palestine (mainly the West Bank as Gaza is blockaded). The vulnerability of the
Palestinian rural population is compounded by a disproportionate share of employ-
ment in agriculture. In general, it is argued that rural wages are lower (among other
things) because of the lower stock of human capital in rural Palestine. We argue that
the disproportionate share of employment in agriculture coupled with higher share of
employment in Israel is potentially contributing to the lower stock of human capital in
rural areas. To improve the well-being of Palestinian rural areas, it is imperative to
understand the dynamics of employment in agriculture and its effect on wages.
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The literature on wage gaps in labor economics cites three types of gaps: a gender
wage gap in favor of males, an urban rural wage gap in favor of urban areas, and a sec-
tor wage gap in favor of non-agricultural jobs vis-à-vis agricultural jobs. The magnitude
of such gaps varies with country and estimation technique. Hertz et al. (2008) provide
estimates for the unexplained portion of the gap which can reach at least 30 % for the
farm/non-farm wage employees and rise to 56 % in some cases. Their contention is that
the urban-rural wage gap is higher where the probability of getting a job in urban cen-
ters remains low. Although early models of development conflated the terms rural and
agricultural employment, the distinction has become more important in recent years.
Winters et al. (2008) investigate whether wage employment in agriculture has potential
in improving the well-being of rural areas for 14 countries. They find that investment
in education and infrastructure are far more important for finding high-paying jobs
than for choosing a particular sector. This distinction implies that the traditional view
of rural workers having only the option to migrate because of the higher expected wage
and greater probability of getting a job in the urban centers is no longer the only viable
solution to rural workers. Rather, individuals have a choice in finding non-agricultural
jobs in the rural areas.
Gollin et al. (2014) applied improved measurements of inputs (human capital and
hours worked) and outputs to find out that a sizable productivity gap still exists in agri-
culture. This suggests that moving workers out of agriculture shall improve productiv-
ity in agriculture and reduce the inefficiency of resource misallocation. In an earlier
paper, Lagakos and Waugh (2009) argue that subsistence food requirements motivate
low-productivity workers to self-select into agriculture. On the other hand, the urban/
rural wage gap is partly shown to depend on spatial mobility (Lagakos et al. 2016) argu-
ing that sorting and migration cost explain the spatial wage gap.
In a recent article, Fallah and Daoud (2015) investigate the impact of restrictions im-
posed by the occupation authorities on area C, which falls directly under Israeli security
jurisdiction, on wages; they find that there is an 8 % gap between area C and the other
areas.1 The restrictions include an almost complete ban on construction as well as
limits on the movement of labor and goods among other measures. Area C is mostly
rural; thus, one would expect lower wages resulting from the restrained labor demand.
Their findings reveal a 13 % wage gap between rural and urban residents and that the
area C gap is not mainly driven by Israeli restrictions, but rather “a rural character
effect.” Prior to that, Daoud (2005) showed a much lower gap using 1999 and 2001
data. Depending on specification, the 1999 data showed that average wages in rural areas
enjoyed a 1–2 % premium over urban dwellers. This gap turned negative (around −3 %)
in 2001 with a higher negative impact for rural females over males. In addition, the clos-
ure of Israeli labor markets led to higher unemployment and lower wages.
Our paper complements the literature in that it explores the role of employment in
agriculture in the determination of wages for rural and non-rural workers. None of the
reviewed works addresses this issue directly.2 Therefore, the contribution of our paper
is twofold: first, we find evidence that employment in agriculture has a bigger negative
effect on wages for rural residents, and second, it is the first to apply the selection in
agriculture in Palestine. The implications of these findings suggest that there is a stron-
ger case for reallocating workers out of agriculture in rural Palestine. It is also evident
that the Israeli labor market cannot be relied upon as a source of higher wages and
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employment in the long run as it may be responsible for the lower return to education
particularly in rural areas.
The present study is the first to consider rural labor market and self-selection into
agriculture in Palestine. It shows the average daily wage distributions for rural and
non-rural areas in the years 1999 and 2012. Figure 1 below suggests that the distribu-
tions are closer in 2012 compared to 1999 and a slight improvement for rural wages.3
By controlling for migration (to the Israeli labor market), education, occupation, and
other worker and industry characteristics, we aim to estimate the effect of employment
in the agricultural sector on the rural and non-rural population and find out which fac-
tors affect the decision to select into agriculture.
While the Israeli labor market has been shrinking its dependency on Palestinian
workers since 1993 and more severely since 2000,4 the Palestinian Authority (PA) has
been opening opportunities for skilled workers in the public sector.5 As a result, many
rural workers ended up with government jobs, meanwhile taking part in casual agricul-
tural work (Sayre 2001). The PA followed a policy of support to the agricultural sector
to increase the resilience of the rural work force and to avoid land confiscation by Israel
for settlement activities. However, employment in agriculture in rural Palestine is simi-
lar to many other developing countries in that it is seasonal, but it differs because it
acts as a refuge for workers whose employment is disrupted due to political unrest.
The rural population makes up 17 % of the total Palestinian population, which accounts
for almost three quarters of a million people, thus making the impact of political as
well as structural factors on wages and reallocation a large one.
Our hypothesis is that the sector of employment matters significantly for rural wages.
In particular, the rural population relies heavily on agriculture for employment and that
may be responsible for the rural-non-rural wage gap. As the economy grows, reliance
on agriculture as a sector of employment diminishes overtime; hence, one would expect
a convergence of wages in the two areas (Hnatkovska and Lahiri 2013). Rural areas also
depend more heavily on employment in Israel (where wages are higher), but the im-
portance of this source of disparity has been diminishing overtime due to restriction on
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Fig. 1 The distribution of average daily wage for rural and non-rural workers. The density functions excluded
observations where average daily wage is greater than 250 NIS; this accounts for 59 observations out of 22,249
total for 1999 and 330 out of 19,445 for the year 2012
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that rural and non-rural wages will tend to converge as the agricultural share of em-
ployment gets smaller and access to the Israeli labor market becomes more restricted.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents a review of the relevant
literature; the data and descriptive analysis that motivate the model are presented next.
Section 4 explains the econometric methodology, followed by the empirical findings.
Finally, Section 6 concludes and provides policy recommendations.
2 Literature review
Recent studies focusing on migration report that urban-rural wage gap represents a
spatial misallocation of labor and is the motivating factor for urban bound migration.
Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) report that the net gains from migration are still posi-
tive and large even after adjusting for purchasing power parity (PPP) and weighing the
data by the probability of unemployment and underemployment.6 Lagakos et al. (2016)
echo similar findings in that the urban rural wage gap results primarily from sorting,
disutility from migration, and migration risk. Evidence on the sorting hypothesis for
Middle Eastern countries was addressed by McCormick and Wahba (2005) who found
evidence that the supply side is responsible at least in part for the concentration of the
skilled workers in big cities.
Stiglitz (1974) provided a model of labor turnover as a reason why firms in urban
centers pay a higher wage than in the rural sector. In his model, monitoring and train-
ing are the driving forces behind a rural-urban wage gap despite the widespread un-
employment in less developing countries. Recent studies point to the agglomeration
effect (Combes et al. 2008) in enhancing worker productivity from being in urban cen-
ters where most of the jobs are located. The sorting effect is another mechanism
through which urban wages can be higher than rural wages due to lower job search
cost of better job offers (Kim 1990).
The literature on wage setting in rural agriculture postulates that there are some indi-
viduals who are satisfied with a subsistence7 level of consumption; thus, the less pro-
ductive ones select into agriculture in an economy where overall efficiency is low.
Developed economies, on the other hand, are more efficient; thus, the few that select
into agriculture must be more productive than the average. This, according to Lagakos
and Waugh (2013), results into larger differences in agricultural productivity between
developed and less developing countries.8 Another breed of papers distinguishes be-
tween the types of wage contracts. Moretti and Perloff (2002) use the efficiency wage
model to explain wage differential in agriculture in California. They distinguish between
two types of payments: the first is the direct hire model, and the second is through
local labor contractors. The first group gets higher wages as a mechanism to reduce
monitoring cost and shirking. They test the efficiency wage model against alternative
models and find evidence that the efficiency wage model outperforms the human cap-
ital model, the dual labor market model, and insurance model.
Ahmad (1982) uses the labor supply-demand framework to address the question as
to why widespread unemployment and underemployment in developing countries
would not depress wages in agriculture. He distinguishes between voluntary and invol-
untary unemployment. The increased labor supply of the involuntarily unemployed cas-
ual worker is very small (relative to total unemployment) to depress wages. His
contention is that the surplus labor model of Lewis (1954) and the efficiency wage
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model of Leibenstein (1957) and Bliss and Stern (1976) are not sufficient to explain
wage behavior. The reason is that the subsistence wage model necessitates a wage level
enough to perpetuate the population; therefore, in a country with an increasing popula-
tion, wages must be higher than the subsistence level (Ahmad 1982). On the other
hand, the efficiency wage model requires a certain caloric intake which Bliss and Stern
(1976) found is less than what is needed to support the efficiency wage. Both of these
theories alone cannot explain wages in agricultural Bangladesh. Ahmad (1982) postu-
lates that structural factors such as inequality in land distribution, cropping intensity,
and tenancy positively affect wages, while the proportion of agricultural wage laborers
and uncertainty in production affect wages negatively.9
The literature on rural and agricultural wages in the occupied Palestinian territory
(oPt) is less frequent. Many studies have recently focused on the wages of Palestinian
workers in general. The focus was prompted by Angrist’s studies (1995, 1996, and
1998) of returns to education and employment in Israel.10 Angrist (1995) finds declin-
ing returns to education due to increased supply of university graduates. Daoud (2005)
finds low returns to education, but at the margin, returns to female education are
higher. The analysis in Daoud (2005) reveals that closures11 have a differential impact
on males and females’ unemployment; the ratio of male to female unemployment in-
creased from 1.4 in 1999 to 3.5 in the Intifada year 2001. Daoud and Shanti (2012) in-
vestigated employment sector choice and wage differential and find that education has
a more profound effect on female participation in all sectors. They also find that male
wages are higher in the public sector than in the private sector but that the gap is
mostly explainable by the endowment effect. On the other hand, the male/female wage
gap in the private sector is not mostly explained by endowments; rather, it is unex-
plained for the most part. Sayre (2001) utilized the same data used by Angrist (1995) to
compare the wage premium due to schooling between 1981 and 2001. In another study,
Sayre and Miller (2004) examined the relationship between labor demand shocks and
the reversal of returns to education in Palestine; they argue that the establishment of
the PA increased the demand for skilled workers leading to an increase in the wages of
skilled workers relative to the unskilled wages. Hazan and Zoabi (2011) treat the wage
issue from a different perspective, looking at fertility issues and parental preference for
boys rather than girls in an attempt to explain the higher female returns. Mansour
(2010) shows that employment restrictions on Palestinians employed in Israel consti-
tute a negative labor supply shock leading to an increase in the schooling return. Miaari
(2009) uses quantile regression to decompose wage differential for private/public sector.
Tansel and Daoud (2011) provide a comparative analysis of returns to education on
Palestine and Turkey. Daoud and Sadeq (2012) investigate the determinants of returns
to education using quarterly labor force survey data covering 1996–2011.
The emphasis in the previous literature is on returns to education with public-private
sector selection correction or gender self-selection. The rural sector is introduced sim-
ply as a dummy variable to check whether rural sector wages are higher or lower than
urban and camp dwellers.
3 Data and sample descriptive statistics
This section provides an overview of some Palestinian labor market regularities relating
to rural and non-rural employment patterns. The structural distribution of wage
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employment, schooling, and employment in Israel are thought to have strong and vary-
ing effect on rural and non-rural wages. We first focus our attention on wage distribu-
tions for rural and non-rural Palestine. Our data comes from the PCBS household
labor force survey data covering the period starting with the first quarter of 1999 to
quarter four of 2012.12 The frequency of the data is quarterly; each household is inter-
viewed twice successively—dropped from the sample for two quarters, and then re-
interviewed for another two quarters. The average daily wage is reported in New Israeli
Shekel (NIS). Figure 1 below gives an overall description of rural and non-rural wage
densities.
The wage density in Fig. 1 shows that in 2012, rural wages have a higher peak which is
the opposite of 1999 but that the two distributions are closer together in 2012 implying that
the wage gap is getting narrower. The forces at work that may be responsible for this con-
vergence phenomenon are structural transformation factors (distribution of employment by
industry), human capital factors (education, experience, and other socioeconomic factors),
supply and demand shocks resulting from political unrest (2006 and 2001 dummies), migra-
tion, and employment in Israel. For example, if more workers from non-rural areas work in
Israel (where wages are higher), and access to the Israeli labor market is becoming more re-
stricted, then we expect non-rural wages to fall on average, thus getting closer to wages in
rural areas. Alternatively, an increased demand in the public sector would tend to draw
workers from agriculture to public service, thus raising wages for agricultural rural workers.
Figure 5 below shows that average years of schooling for rural residents has been catching
up with non-rural schooling which tend to narrow the gap.
The structural transformation hypothesis postulates that (Caselli and Coleman 2001;
Hnatkovska and Lahiri 2013) increases in agricultural productivity release workers from
agriculture and increase the supply of labor to urban centers (migration) lowering the
urban workers’ relative wage. Our data suggests that the share of rural employment in
agriculture tends to fluctuate with a declining trend reaching 38.6 % in the fourth
quarter of 2006 and a low 17.4 % in the third quarter of 2010.13 However, during the
same period, this proportion stays around 10 % for non-rural areas. The distribution of
employment by industry averaged over the entire sample period is given below (Fig. 2).
The share of employment in other services, which is mainly from the public sector, is
highest for both rural and non-rural workers; it is however one and a half times larger
for non-rural workers. The opposite is true for the construction sector; the proportion











Fig. 2 Employment distribution by industry and type of locality
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Agriculture’s share of rural employment is roughly 12 % in rural areas, while it is only
8 % for non-rural workers. These differences are likely to have an impact on the wages
of workers in both areas, as well as on migration. The migration data shows that for
the oPt as a whole, the proportion of workers who work in the same district of resi-
dence fluctuates around 60 % for the West Bank and 20 % for Gaza. This implies that
the proportion that migrates (which includes another district, Israel, and international
locations) is much higher in Gaza Strip. Thus, fewer people migrate to other districts
and other locations in the West Bank.14 This may be a reflection of lower wage gap be-
tween rural and non-rural areas, or that movement restrictions are the reason. Yashiv
(2008) uses Israel Central Bureau of Statistics on Palestinian workers in Israel; he finds
that migrants are less skilled than stayers. The results also indicate that a high migra-
tion premium attracts migrants but that skilled workers will get a low return (offered
low skill jobs) and are thus deterred.
For the rural population (and the urban population as well), employment in Israel
and the settlements is the location of choice because wages are higher. The proportion
of total employment in Israel is higher for rural areas than it is in non-rural areas,
which tends to raise rural wages above those in non-rural areas.
The human capital model, Mincer (1974) and Becker (1964), relates wages to years of
schooling, experience, and quadratic experience to account for concavity in the earn-
ings profile. Figure 3 below shows a time series plot of quarterly average years of
schooling versus average daily wage for rural and non-rural workers. The evidence
shows that while schooling is higher on average for non-rural workers, their wages tend
to be occasionally lower.
Between 2000 and 2010, the average daily wage series for rural and non-rural are
practically indistinguishable from each other, while the schooling gap is wide and is not
changing drastically. Meanwhile, the schooling gap is narrowing after 2009, while the
wage gap is widening. This suggests that employment in Israel may be the reason be-
hind this divergence in wages (see Fig. 4).
Figure 4 provides a time series plot of average years of schooling and proportion of
employment in Israel for rural and non-rural areas for each quarter. This plot illustrates
the extent to which wage differentials depend on differences in employment shares. It
is clear that since the outbreak of the second Intifada (fourth quarter of 2000), the pro-
portion of rural employment in Israel dropped from 30 % to almost 7 % and nearly
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Fig. 3 Proportion of workers who work and reside in the same district
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for that period. Also, for the year 2012, the gap in employment shares is very wide, so
is the wage gap. The data also suggests that rural wages are more volatile and seem to
have a positive covariance with employment in Israel (Fig. 5).
The years 2000, 2009, and 2012 highlight the positive association between share of
employment in Israel for rural residents and rural wages. Regression analyses in subse-
quent sections show that employment in Israel has a large wage premium despite the
lower schooling for such workers (i.e., lower returns to schooling).
4 Model
The sample descriptive statistics in the preceding section suggest some factors which
could be responsible for the differential impact on rural and non-rural wages. The in-
clusion of the vector of socioeconomic variables for each type of locality helps identify
the differential impact. The empirical strategy to assess such differential impact is to es-
timate the Mincer earning equation (Mincer 1974) using PCBS labor force survey data
that covers the 1999–2012 period. The worker’s log average daily wage is a function of
worker’s demographic, educational attainment, and labor characteristics.15 The main
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Fig. 5 Employment in Israel and wages
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classified into agricultural and non-agricultural sector. This industry classification is
formed as an industry dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the agricultural sec-
tor and 0 for other sectors. All else equal, the coefficient of industry classification esti-
mates the wage differential between agriculture relative to other sectors (the reference
group).
The above analysis is based on rural wage employment. Still, a considerable share of
rural total employment is unpaid family workers (12 % in 2010). This is likely to create
selectivity bias, which would produce a downward bias of the industry estimate. Maluc-
cio (1998) shows that OLS estimates of returns to schooling are biased downward by as
much as 60 % if selection is ignored. We control for unpaid wage-selectivity bias by
controlling for parent’s type of industry. In particular, workers’ and their parent’s type
of industry is the same. The rationale of using parent’s type of industry is that it in-
creases the probability of selecting the same business.16
Another source of selectivity bias17 is industry self-selection. That is, workers are
not-necessarily randomly distributed across industries. We correct for this selectivity
bias using Heckman’s (1976) two-stage estimation model. The first-stage model is a
Probit model in which the dependent variable (D) is a binary variable, which takes 1 for
workers employed in agriculture sector and 0 for those employed in non-agriculture
sector. This dependent variable is regressed on worker’s demographic characteristics
(X), education attainment, and type of industry. We also control for other variables that
would affect worker’s self-selection, including a dummy variable that indicates if a
worker’s type of industry is the same as his/her parent. This, as explained above, is used
to control for unpaid wage employees.
5 Empirical results
Estimates of model are reported in Tables 1 and 2; we begin by the wage equation
where self-selection is considered for people who are wage employees in agriculture.18
The equations are estimated for the two subpopulations, rural and non-rural popula-
tions. The motivation for this sample splitting regression is to check for observed dif-
ferences in the wage determination for each area. Although we estimate the wage
equation as a linear function of schooling at this stage, we do provide non-linear
specifications in Tables 5 and 6. The schooling coefficient is very low for both areas,19
and it indicates that a linear specification means an increase in schooling by 1 year
leads to a 0.7 % increase in average daily wage; the coefficient is significant for both
areas (rural and non-rural). Regressions on a year by year basis yield estimates more in
line with the ones reported in the literature. The earnings profile is evident by the sign
of age and age square which are significant and have a positive and negative signs, re-
spectively.20 Female earnings are 14.9 % lower than their male counterparts in non-
rural areas. This is compared with 12 % in rural areas.
Controlling for workers’ education, being employed in Israel results in a higher wage
premium in non-rural areas; a non-rural worker would earn 59.2 % more than a person
with the same attributes that is employed domestically. Rural workers in Israel earn
only 43.9 % more than their domestically employed counterparts. Investigation of the
wage distributions for rural and non-rural workers reveals that the wage distributions
for those who work in Israel and the settlements are negatively skewed (left) for non-
rural workers while it is positively skewed (right) for rural workers. In such cases, it is
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better to use the median than the mean; the median wage ratio of rural to non-rural
employed in Israel and the settlements is 85.7 % while the same ratio is at parity in the
domestic market. The distribution over occupations is very similar except that the pro-
portion is a little higher for non-rural workers in services and shop sales; however, the
bulk is in elementary occupations for both groups. We are unable to disentangle
whether the place of work is in Israel or the settlements21 which may account for part
of this disparity.
Because the selection equation is for employment in agriculture, we cannot include
industry dummies. Instead, we use occupation categories in which elementary occupa-
tion is the base category. Of particular interest is the coefficient on skilled agricultural
and fishery workers. Being a skilled agricultural worker implies no significant change in
Table 1 Heckman joint maximum likelihood estimates of the wage equation
Non-rural population Rural population
Coeff. Se P value Coeff. Se P value
Schooling 0.0078 0.0019 0.0000 0.0069 0.0020 0.0010
Age 0.0270 0.0032 0.0000 0.0281 0.0038 0.0000
Age square −0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
Female −0.1493 0.0401 0.0000 −0.1209 0.0316 0.0000
Work in Israel 0.5928 0.0151 0.0000 0.4390 0.0147 0.0000
Occupation dummiesa
Legislators and senior administrators 0.8794 0.4129 0.0330 −0.1359 0.0506 0.0070
Professionals and clerks 0.4532 0.1179 0.0000 0.4596 0.1139 0.0000
Services and shop sales 0.1468 0.0863 0.0890 −0.1190 0.1218 0.3290
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers −0.0106 0.0236 0.6510 0.0820 0.0232 0.0000
Crafts’ workers 0.2197 0.1220 0.0720 −0.0313 0.0976 0.7490
Plant and machine operators 0.2561 0.0685 0.0000 0.2338 0.0733 0.0010
Governorate dummiesa
Jenin 0.6312 0.0334 0.0000 0.5724 0.0331 0.0000
Tubas 0.5664 0.0240 0.0000 0.3333 0.0325 0.0000
Tulkarem 0.5428 0.0256 0.0000 0.4939 0.0376 0.0000
Nablus 0.7052 0.0722 0.0000 0.4553 0.0420 0.0000
Qalqilia 0.6708 0.0357 0.0000 0.6496 0.0409 0.0000
Salfeet 0.8953 0.0785 0.0000 0.8024 0.0496 0.0000
Ramallah 0.8628 0.0991 0.0000 0.6479 0.0412 0.0000
Jericho 0.5522 0.0219 0.0000 0.3573 0.0303 0.0000
Jerusalem 1.0478 0.0459 0.0000 0.8206 0.0555 0.0000
41 1.0697 0.0464 0.0000
Bethlahim 0.7395 0.0630 0.0000 0.7379 0.0525 0.0000
Hebron 0.6721 0.0307 0.0000 0.5415 0.0388 0.0000
GS-north 0.2208 0.0247 0.0000 0.2184 0.0669 0.0010
Gaza city 0.2416 0.0379 0.0000 0.1985 0.0443 0.0000
Deir Albalah 0.0719 0.0258 0.0050 0.0440 0.0624 0.4810
Khan younis −0.0364 0.0219 0.0960 0.0837 0.0350 0.0170
Constant 2.6862 0.0790 0.0000 2.7360 0.0949 0.0000
Quarter dummies are removed for brevity and can be made available at request
aThe base groups for occupation dummies is elementary occupations, for quarter dummies is the third quarter of 2012,
and for governorate is Rafah
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wages for non-rural population; however, having this occupation implies an increase by
about 8 % above the level of elementary occupations for the rural population. Profes-
sional clerks have the highest occupation premium in rural areas. The average daily
wage for workers in services and shop sales are not significantly different from those in
elementary occupations in rural areas.
Finally, workers in almost all governorates have higher wages than Rafah governorate
(a depressed area in Gaza on the border with Egypt) with varying degrees. The geo-
graphic wage differential is often lower in rural areas, for example, Deir Albalah wages are
practically the same as those in Rafah but Salfeet enjoys an 80 % premium. In non-rural
areas, the gap is as low as −3.6 % for Khan Younis and as high as 105 % in Jerusalem’s
favor. West Bank and Gaza differences are evident from the coefficients on the last four
governorate dummies (located in Gaza). Differences with Rafah are much lower in Gaza
than in West Bank governorates.
On the question why do individuals select to work in agriculture, we find evidence
suggesting that schooling and total household wage income reduce the probability of
being employed in agriculture significantly (by 3.4 and 0.1 %, respectively). The differ-
ences in the magnitude for each of those variables are not large. The time dummies are
included to show the effect of severe political closures on employment in agriculture;
the 2006 dummy shows that for rural areas, the probability of selecting into agriculture
increased and was significant and, for non-rural areas, it was not significant. This sup-
ports the view that more people turn to agriculture for employment when other market
opportunities disappear. This confirms the employment consequences on rural and
non-rural areas. Closures have a more serious impact on wages and unemployment for
rural areas, thus giving agriculture special support and/or programs is important for
the rural population.22 We also find that if the household head is employed in agricul-
ture, the likelihood of selecting the agricultural sector increases dramatically. Larger
households and never married23 are also more likely to select this sector.
Estimation with selection correction requires that the error terms from the first stage
and second stage be correlated, which means if it is found that errors from the wage
Table 2 Heckman Joint maximum likelihood estimates of the selection equation (robust
standard errors)
Variable Non-rural population Rural
Coeff. Se P value Coeff. Se P value
Household head works in agriculture 10.078 0.036 0.000 9.201 0.065 0.000
Household size 0.056 0.003 0.000 0.043 0.004 0.000
Total household wage income −0.001 0.000 0.000 −0.003 0.000 0.000
2001 dummy −0.046 0.050 0.360 −0.101 0.057 0.079
2006 dummy −0.063 0.052 0.232 0.189 0.042 0.000
Never married 0.609 0.033 0.000 0.751 0.037 0.000
Schooling −0.045 0.003 0.000 −0.038 0.003 0.000
Constant −3.048 0.045 0.000 −2.662 0.053 0.000
Rho −0.017 0.019 −0.010 0.024
Sigma 0.381 0.005 0.346 0.006
Lambda −0.006 0.007 −0.003 0.008
Chi2 (1) 0.760 0.384 0.170 0.679
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equation are not correlated with the errors from the selection equation, then OLS esti-
mates are not biased and it is legitimate to run two independent regressions: OLS for
wages and Probit for selection. The correlation coefficient (ρue) can be either positive
or negative. A negative coefficient means that some omitted variable in the wage equa-
tion affects the selection in an opposite direction to its effect on wages. In such a case
(negative ρue and hence λ), the inverse Mills ratio will be significant and individuals
who select agriculture will have lower average wages. The likelihood ratio test (LR) tests
the hypothesis of independent equations (H0: ρue = 0), that is no selection bias. The re-
sults of the selection equation are reported in Table 2 (first-stage estimates). The sign
of ρue and hence λ is negative. That implies that individuals who self-select into agricul-
ture will have a negative impact on average wages. On the other hand, because wages
for those in agriculture and other industries are observed, it would make sense to con-
sider the issue as one of endogeneity and estimate the regression by instrumental vari-
ables (IV). We report the joint maximum likelihood estimation results since an
alternative specification, which includes the linear and quadratic terms of tenure in-
stead of the linear and quadratic term of age, results in a highly significant LR test.
Finally, we report the OLS and IV estimates of the wage equation using the independent
variables in the selection equation (in addition to the wage equation regressors) as instru-
ments for employed in agricultural dummy. An individual employed in agriculture will
have the value of 1 and zero otherwise. Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 report estimates of the OLS
and IV estimates for the wage equation. The coefficient on agricultural industry dummy
indicates that wages for workers employed in agriculture are 34 and 37 % lower for non-
Table 3 OLS estimates of the wage equation (robust Se)
Variablea Non-rural Rural
Coeff. P value Coeff. P value
Schooling 0.029 0.000 0.019 0.000
Age 0.054 0.000 0.038 0.000
Age square −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Female −0.304 0.000 −0.387 0.000
Work in Israel 0.710 0.000 0.587 0.000
Occupation dummiesa
Legislators and senior administrators 0.492 0.000 0.317 0.000
Professionals and clerks 0.203 0.000 0.051 0.009
Services and shop sales 0.009 0.570 −0.122 0.000
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (Omitted) (Omitted)
Crafts’ workers 0.009 0.547 0.054 0.002
Plant and machine operators −0.051 0.001 −0.055 0.002
Elementary occupations −0.070 0.000 −0.091 0.000
Work in agriculture −0.259 0.000 −0.300 0.000
Constant 2.478 0.000 3.457 0.000
N 156,647 68,609
R-squared 0.6805 0.6973
Mean VIF 4.0 15.2
aQuarterly dummies and governorate dummies are not reported for brevity, and the set of instruments includes the
wage plus selection equation variables. The VIF for the work in agriculture is 1.29, for the skilled agricultural and fishery
workers is omitted, and for the non-rural inhabitants. For the rural population, the VIF for the work in agriculture is 1.29
and for the skilled agricultural and fishery workers is omitted
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rural and rural areas (Table 4). The OLS estimates are consistent with the IV estimates
but smaller in magnitude. The effects of schooling, gender, and work in Israel premium
are similar whether OLS or IV is used.24
Turning to non-linear specification of schooling, we find that the models’ predictive
ability improves marginally. Tables 5 and 6 report a non-linear specification of the
schooling variable and use tenure in the last job instead of potential experience. We
find an increase in R2 and significant “degree effect.” Results show that workers with
graduate degrees earn as much as 74 % more than illiterates for non-rural areas, but
60 % in rural areas (Table 6). Thus, returns to schooling are lower in rural areas sug-
gesting that the proportion of employment in Israel (typically lower skills and higher
wages) may be contributing to this phenomenon.
Wooldridge’s (1995) score test of exogeneity of employment in agriculture is rejected
at high levels (5 % or lower) giving support to the endogeneity of employment in agri-
culture. OLS results in Tables 3 and 5 support the argument that employment in agri-
culture contributes to decreasing wages; however, the magnitude is lower owing
possibly to endogeneity bias.
6 Conclusions
Aiming to identify the role of agricultural and non-agricultural employment in improv-
ing the well-being of the Palestinian rural population through their impact on wages,
this paper investigates the determinants of wages for rural and non-rural areas. The de-
velopment literature postulates that the development process is likely to be associated
with rural urban migration as a result of improvement in worker productivity in agri-
culture. At the same time, agglomeration effects will tend to make urban-rural wage
Table 4 IV estimates of the wage equation (robust Se)
Variablea Non-rural Rural
Coeff. P value Coeff. P value
Schooling 0.028 0.000 0.017 0.000
Age 0.050 0.000 0.037 0.000
Age square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Female −0.247 0.000 −0.318 0.000
Work in Israel 0.721 0.000 0.577 0.000
Occupation dummiesa
Legislators and senior administrators 0.598 0.000 0.433 0.000
Professionals and clerks 0.298 0.000 0.147 0.000
Services and shop sales 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.971
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.088 0.000 0.145 0.000
Crafts’ workers 0.116 0.000 0.177 0.000
Plant and machine operators 0.022 0.000 0.037 0.000
Elementary occupations (omitted) (omitted)
Work in agriculture −0.344 0.000 −0.372 0.000
Constant 2.606 0.000 3.163 0.000
N 114,059 48,115
R-squared 0.689 0.7076
aQuarterly dummies and governorate dummies are not reported for brevity, and the set of instruments includes the
wage plus selection equation variables
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gap diminish due to the increased labor supply from rural areas. Our study hypothe-
sizes that proximity to the Israeli labor market tends to raise rural wages due to the
higher share of employment in Israel for the rural areas. However, employment in Israel
and the settlements may be a cause for concern with respect to rural-urban wage differ-
ential and the impact on unemployment resulting from closures. Given the lower aver-
age years of schooling for rural workers and the lower wage in agriculture rural wages
may decline if employment in Israel continues to diminish in importance for rural
workers. The political stalemate in the peace process (and Israeli policy) will deter
many Palestinians from seeking employment in Israel in the long run.
The findings of regression analysis lead us to the following: first, the employment in
agriculture lowers average wages by a range from 26 to 34 % for the non-rural popula-
tion and 30–37 % for rural population. Meanwhile, Israeli closures tend to raise the
probability of selecting agriculture as a sector for employment. This implies that special
educational programs be designed to improve the well-being of farm workers especially
rural areas.
Second, the return to education is lower for rural workers than for non-rural ones,
coupled with the information that average years of schooling is lower for rural workers
and that the returns show signs of being higher at higher education levels (convexity);
Table 5 OLS estimates of the wage equation (robust Se, non-linear schooling)
Variablea Non-rural Rural
Coeff. P value Coeff. P value
Illiterate (Omitted) (Omitted)
Primary 0.133 0.000 0.107 0.000
Secondary and lower diploma 0.246 0.000 0.172 0.000
College and higher diploma 0.460 0.000 0.370 0.000
Graduate 0.784 0.000 0.602 0.000
Tenure 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
Tenure square −2.000E−07 0.000 −1.600E−07 0.000
Female −0.272 0.000 −0.364 0.000
Work in Israel 0.729 0.000 0.584 0.000
Occupation dummiesa
Legislators and senior administrators (Omitted) (Omitted)
Professionals and clerks −0.243 0.000 −0.231 0.000
Services and shop sales −0.421 0.000 −0.363 0.000
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers −0.417 0.000 −0.244 0.000
Crafts’ workers −0.436 0.000 −0.191 0.000
Plant and machine operators −0.407 0.000 −0.265 0.000
Elementary occupations −0.470 0.000 −0.330 0.000
Work in agriculture −0.286 0.000 −0.312 0.000
Constant 4.135 0.000 3.990 0.000
N 160,445 7066
R-squared 0.686 0.704
Mean VIF 4.02 5.2
aQuarterly dummies and governorate dummies are not reported for brevity, and the set of instruments includes the
wage plus selection equation variables. The VIF for the work in agriculture is 1.29, for the skilled agricultural and fishery
workers is 1.37, and for the non-rural inhabitants. For the rural population, the VIF for the work in agriculture is 1.69 and
for the skilled agricultural and fishery workers is 1.72
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then, rural areas require policies which encourage higher education to lower the gap
with non-rural areas.
Third, geographic disparity in wages between the West Bank and Gaza has strong im-
plications for ending the political divide between the two areas that exists since Hamas
took over Gaza in 2008 and Fatah remains in control of the West Bank. If the govern-
ments in both areas agree on securing a safe passage between the West Bank and
Gaza,25 labor market integration would mean the wage gap that exists would be lower
as low-wage workers will tend to migrate to higher wage regions.
Fourth, having a household head who works in agriculture is a highly significant fac-
tor in explaining the selection of agriculture as a sector of employment. Other factors
that lead to a higher probability of selecting agriculture are household size, the 2006
period (following Hamas’s control of the Palestinian Legislative Council elections),
household wage income, and single individuals. Schooling significantly reduces the
probability of selecting wage employment in agriculture. Thus, if schooling raises wages
and lowers selection into agriculture, the policy implication is to increase the schooling
of rural population.
Fifth, the gender wage gap is higher in non-rural areas. The literature review shows
that part of this gap is unexplained by endowments (possibly a big share of the gap);
thus, a thorough investigation is needed to understand the source of this gap, hence
contributing to its reduction.
Table 6 IV estimates of the wage equation (robust Se, non-linear schooling)
Variablea Non-rural Rural
Coeff. P value Coeff. P value
Illiterate (Omitted) (Omitted)
Primary 0.121 0.000 0.119 0.000
Secondary and lower diploma 0.217 0.000 0.174 0.000
College and higher diploma 0.416 0.000 0.360 0.000
Graduate 0.739 0.000 0.598 0.000
Tenure 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000
Tenure square −1.710E−07 0.000 −1.370E−07 0.000
Female −0.229 0.000 −0.305 0.000
Work in Israel 0.734 0.000 0.576 0.000
Occupation dummiesa
Legislators and senior administrators 0.507 0.000 0.351 0.000
Professionals and clerks 0.251 0.000 0.103 0.000
Services and shop sales 0.080 0.000 −0.003 0.000
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.055 0.002 0.134 0.662
Crafts’ workers 0.079 0.000 0.175 0.000
Plant and machine operators 0.064 0.000 0.073 0.000
Elementary occupations (Omitted) (Omitted) 0.000
Work in agriculture −0.331 0.000 −0.352 0.000
Constant 3.680 0.000 3.731 0.000
N 116,938 49,596
R-squared 0.700 0.715
aQuarterly dummies and governorate dummies are not reported for brevity, and the set of instruments includes the
wage plus selection equation variables
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In light of the preceding, policies aimed at increasing productivity of workers in agricul-
ture are required to reduce the wage gap between rural and non-rural workers particularly
for those who choose agricultural employment. Employment in Israel and the settlement
should not be a long-term strategy for Palestinian workers despite its positive impact on
rural wages; its long-run impact on schooling might be devastating for it lowers the return
on education making it an un-attractive investment. Also, since periods of political unrest
and conflict (characterized by closures and access restrictions) lead to labor market dis-
ruptions, the PA may consider lower dependence on the Israeli labor market for employ-
ment in favor of agricultural sector employment. The evidence on higher return for
higher education (convexity of returns to education) implies that expenditure on higher
education is an attractive option for both rural and non-rural areas.
Endnotes
1The 1993 Oslo peace accords between the PLO and Israel resulted in the division of
the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip into three distinct security areas. Area A is
mostly urban and refugee camps and falls under Palestinian security control. Area B is
a joint security control and mostly townships. Area C is under Israeli security control
and is mostly villages and vast unpopulated land.
2A search in jstore and Google on the differential impact of employment in agricul-
ture on rural and urban localities resulted in many hits of the agricultural/non-agricul-
tural wage gap or rural-urban wage gap; however, none of the papers directly addressed
this issue.
3The constant of the wage equation is slightly higher for rural areas in most
regressions.
4The impact of the Israeli policy of switching reliance on foreign guest workers in-
stead of Palestinian workers on Palestinian employment and wages is analyzed in Ara-
nki and Daoud (2010). The authors show that just over 40 % of the Gazan labor force
and about 32 % of West Bank labor force were employed in Israel in the mid-1980s.
These figures dropped to roughly 5 and 10 % for Gaza and the West Bank, respectively.
5It was not until 2008 that the PA started limiting public employment in the face of
mounting budget deficits and criticism by the academic community of the composition
of current and capital expenditures.
6These results pertain to Indian workers with less than primary education.
7The most commonly addressed issue in the definition of subsistence agriculture is
the small share of output destined to the market. Put another way, subsistence agricul-
ture is predominantly characterized by own consumption (Heidhues and Brüntrup
2003). They argue that although it is seen as synonymous with backwardness and ineffi-
ciency, people choose this type of work as the only means for family survival. They
argue from a theoretical perspective that low wages, high unemployment, and irregular-
ity of payments are responsible for the choice into subsistence farming.
8Petrick and Tyran (2003) provide a theoretical framework that links subsistence agri-
culture to the process of development and structural change. The first incentive for
subsistence farmers to commercialize is the existence of higher profits for commercial
farmers. Second, structural change implies that subsistence farmers may rent their land
to commercial ones, thus losing the security of own consumption. Third, commercial
farming is positively correlated with higher investment and efficiency enhancement
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activities; thus, one would expect a lower capital stock the more subsistence farming
there is. These, among other factors, lead the authors to the hypothesis of the demise
of subsistence agriculture. This, although, in the long run, low labor productivity, low
job creation, persistence of subsistence, and imperfect capital markets may slow down
the process.
9Yellen (1984) and Ezeala-Harrison (2005) provide a good review of efficiency wage
models.
10Angrist’s sample was based on Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics of Palestinian
males ages 18–64.
11This term refers to the restriction on Palestinian workers from reaching the Israeli
labor market.
12For each quarter, household visits began in the first week of the first month in that
quarter and continued for 13 weeks.
132006 was a year in which government activities came to almost a complete stop
after Hamas won the elections with a clear majority taking control of the Palestinian
Legislative Council; consequently, the donor countries halted their donations. On the
other hand, 2010 was a year of good economic performance.
14The smaller area of Gaza and easier movement between governorates can explain
this phenomenon. So in Gaza, it is more of commuting than migration.
15The set of explanatory variables includes schooling, gender, experience, industry,
occupation, marital status, geographic dummies, and quarter dummies.
16Unpaid family members are a prime example.
17Employment in agriculture is included as an explanatory variable in Tables 5 and 6
to show the effect of being employed in agriculture on wages for each type of locality.
18Self-selection results in biased estimates for the wage equation; the sign of the bias
may be upward or downward. See Tansel and Daoud (2011) for more details.
19See Daoud and Sadeq (2012) for more on the determinants of returns to schooling
in Palestine.
20The age-schooling interactive term was dropped due to its insignificance.
21The settlements are scattered mostly over the occupied West Bank outside the
green line separating the West Bank from “Israel.”
22The Palestinian authority (through donor funding) started programs to support
agriculture; the programs include rural roads, irrigation wells, and giving trees to im-
prove and cultivate the land. More support is needed in the area of commercial farming
especially in areas were land confiscation for settlement activity is highly probable.
23This expression excludes widowed, divorced, married, etc.
24Reporting of the variance inflation factor (VIF) at the bottom of Tables 3 and 5 was
motivated by the possibility of high correlation between skilled agricultural and fishery
workers and work in agriculture. These figures turned out to be acceptable (since the
values are less than 4 which is used as a role of thump). But the mean VIF for all re-
gressors turned very high for rural regressions owing district-specific correlations. In all
cases, this would be worrisome if the variables were individually insignificant, but col-
lectively significant which is not the case here.
25It is obvious that this is not a Palestinian decision; Israel is the one who holds the
keys to this issue. While it is necessary that the Palestinians agree on ending the polit-
ical division, Israel has a vested interest in keeping the status quo.
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